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This paper developsasignaling model inwhich accounting
information improvesrealinvestmentdecisions.Pure cashflow




The motivating ideasareasfollows.Outside investorsare
assumed to observe the firm's revenues and net cash flow without
error.But they do not know how tointerpret cash Qjj.flows.If
outflowsarehigherthanexpected,itcouldmeanthatcash
expenditures for current activitiesare unexpectedly high (bad news),
orthatpositive-NPVinvestmentopportunitiesareunexpectedly
expanded (good news).Absent other information, investors' reaction
tohigher-than-expectedoutflowswill"averageout"thesetwo
possibilities,andinmostreasonablecasesthebadnewswill
1dominate.Managers, who know thetruth,will tendto underinvest
inorderto reduce cash outflow, report higher net cash flow, and
support current stock price.
Accounting conventionshelpbypartlydistinguishing current
from investment outflows.Thus expendituresforplant, equipment
and other tangible assets are labeled as investment outflows,and put
on the balance sheet;current income issupposed to equal revenue
less current outflows only.
These conventions are only rules of thumb.If accounting were
perfect,it would classify outflows as "good news"or "bad news," not
by class of expenditure.Thus many good news, positive-NPV outlays
never qualifyforthebalancesheet,for example when expanded
opportunities lead tooutlays for R&D, training and testing,start-up
lossesofnewventuresortechnologies,etc.Unfortunately,
unexpectedly high outlays for R&D, trainingor start-up--andeven
forcapitalequipment--mayreflectproblemswithcurrent
operations(badnews)ratherthanexpandedinvestment
opportunities. Outside investors donot know.Outside accountants do
not know either.1
This paper does not attempttopresent ageneral theoryor
survey of the "meaning of accounting."It presents a simple formal
model in which (1)managers and investors are rationally concerned
with reported book earnings, (2) firmsunderinvest in order to report
lower costsand higher earnings,and(3)book earnings convey
2information not contained in reported cash flow.However, the paper
does notruleout other explanationsforthesethreepoints.For
example,managers'andinvestors'attentiontoreportedearnings
may be triggered by links between managers' personal compensation
and earnings, or by attempts by managers to protect their firms from
adverse regulatory or political developments.Watts and Zimmerman
(1986) review research on these and related lines of argument.2
This paper ignores agency, regulatory and political issues.It
assumesthatmanagers'andstockholders'objectivesarealigned.
Managers, acting in(a particular definition of) shareholders' interest,
bond themselvestoaccept"objective"accountingproceduresto
relievetheunderinvestment caused bysignaling.So farIhave
found no prior research that anticipates this approach or result.3
This paper now turns to assumptions and notation, followed by
a more careful discussion of the boundary between good-news and
bad-news outflows.Then Section 4 shows theconditionsunder
which firms will be tempted to underinvest inorder to pretendto
have more good news than they actually do.Section 5presentsthe
signaling equilibrium, and Section 6 shows how noisy but objective
accountants can reduce underinvestment.Section7containsbrief
concluding comments.
2.AssumptionsandNotation
3The three main ingredients of thesignaling modelsIhave in
mind are:(1)the inability of investors (oroutside accountantsor
objective accounting rules)todistinguish good-news frombad-news
outflows, (2) an objective function whichresponds to current stock
priceaswell asintrinsicvalue, and (3)the resulting signaling-by-
underinvestment problem andthepotentialuseof accountingto
alleviateit.
In the current period the firmreports:
Cashflow=R-X=R-C-I (1)
whereR =cashrevenue
C =cashoutflows for current operations
I=cashoutflows for investment
XC +I=totalcash outflows
Although revenue and totalcash outflows are separately
observable byoutsideinvestors,currentand investmentoutflows
are not.Managers, on the other hand,know C as wellas R.They
accept R and C, but control I.
Managers' investmentdecisionIreflectsthe investment opportunity
schedule G(I), with dG/dI G1> 0at I =0and d2G/d12G11 <0.
Absent asymmetricinformation,the firm would investtothe point
where G1=0.Since financing decisions willplay no role, wecan
implicitlyassume that investmentisfinanced by cutting back cash
dividends or,if necessary, by issuingshares.
4The assumed objective function responds to current stock price Pas
well as intrinsic value V:
maxW =aP+(1-a)V, (2)
whereais a fixed weight between 0 and 1.
This objective could be justified in severalways.For example,
shareholders might vote for it ex ante if each saw a probabilityaof
selling in the upcoming period, and also believed that intrinsic value
is an unbiased predictor of the following period's price (E(Pl)=V0).
Whatever the justification,it'sessential for signaling story that the
objective function put partial weight on the current price P.4
Equilibriumrequiresthatmanagers maximizethisobjective
with respect toI, given current stock price P:
max W =W(I
IR,C,P(I)) (3a)
Also, P must be an unbiased estimate of V given the limited
information available to investors.
P =E(VfR,X) (3b)
Intrinsic firm value V depends on net current cash flow, R -C,
and onG(I).Investors and managers agree onthe form of the
5functionV(R-C,G(I)).Also, V is defined before any payout of
current cash flow and before new shares, if any, are issued to finance
investment.
3.DistinguishingCurrentandInvestmentOutflows
This paper's concept of current and investment outflowsisnot
thesameasthegenerallyacceptedaccountingdefinitionsof
operating cost and capital investment. Istart with a more primitive
idea,thedistinctionbetweencashspenttosupportcurrent
production and other planned,business-as-usualactivitiesand cash
spent in pursuit of newly discovered opportunities.
Firststory. --Thedividinglinebetweencurrentand
investment outflows depends on the nature of thefirm'sactivities.
Think of a firm entering a period with a fixed capital stock anda
commitmenttoproduceawell-definedbasketofproductsor
services.The out-of-pocketcashexpendituresrequiredforthis
productionarenot known exante,but managersobservethem
immediately after productionstarts.At the same time theylearn
aboutnextperiod's demand and decide how muchtospendto
expand thecapitalstock.Investors then observe revenue and total
cash flow and infer what they can about outlays for production and
forinvestment.
Thisisone of severalstoriesthat could be attachedtothe
algebra presented below.This story defines current and investment
6outflows ina more or less standard way.Moreover, we can safely
assumethatlarger-than-expectedoutflowsforpresentproduction
arebad newsandthatlarger-than-expectedinvestmentinnext
period's capital stockis good news (becauseitreveals larger future
demand).
Secondstory.--Hereisa more complex story which
captures more of thispaper's motivation.Suppose the firm enters
the current period with(1)a commitment toproduce a basket of
productsorservicesand(2)aplanned programofinvestment
outlaysforproductdevelopment,training,replacementand
modification of capital stock, etc.This program would include cash
outlays prompted by investment opportunitiesidentifiedinprevious
periods.
Shortlyafterthestart of the period,theactual cash outlays
required for categories(1) and (2)are revealedto managers, who
also learn about any new investment opportunities.The managers
then decide how much cash to invest in the new opportunities.They
also can increase or reduce outlays in category (2).
We can now define current outflowsto include the hands-off
realizations in category (2)--i.e.,the actual cost of the business-as-
usual investments planned at the start of the period:
Operating outflows =C=(1)production outflows plus (2A) actual
cash outflow of planned investment
7Investment outflows =I=(2B)cash flows from modifications
of planned investment plus (3)
investment for new opportunities




below.Thefirstissimpler and easierto connecttoaccounting
practice.The second makesiteasiertoappreciatethereal-life
difficulties of interpreting unexpected cash outflows.
Larger-than-expected cash outflows are normally badnewsin
categories (1) and (2A) and good news in categories (2B) and (3).For
example, suppose the firm is halfway through construction ofa new
manufacturing plant.Ifdifficultiesareencountered, and cashis
flowing out unexpectedly fast, the badnews is reflected in (2A).On
the other hand, it's usually good news if construction ison target but
the firm decides to invest more to bring the planton line faster.This
cash outflow would fall in (2B).
The outside investor who observes the additional cash outflow
usually does not know what itmeans.Whether it's good or bad news
depends on the manager's motive for spending themoney.Of course
managers who worry about current stock priceare always tempted
8to provide the upbeat interpretation of their actions, so a good-news
press release does not resolve the matter.5
Ibelievethatseparationof good-news and bad-news cash
outflowsis,at least for mature firms, the single most difficult task
for outside investors and securityanalysts.Most unexpected cash
outflows have two competing interpretations.Does an increase in R
& D outlays reflect new positive-NPV opportunities or cost overruns
on existing projects?Do unexpected hiring and training costs mean
increases in projected future demand or simply that existing workers
aren't as productive as management had thought?Is purchase of a
new machine motivated by the opportunity to make a new product
orbythediscoverythatoldmachinescan'tcope withcurrent
demand for existing products?It's hard for an outsider to know.
4.TheIncentivetoUnderinvest
The assumptions given so far arestilltoo broad tosupport a
specific signaling model.We can nevertheless explore the conditions
necessary for the incentive to underinvest that will drive the model's
behavior.
Suppose investors believe that the firmisinvesting optimally.
Would its managers be willingto confirm those expectations, given




opportunitiesareunimportant, and investorsare concerned mostly
withnewsaboutcurrentoperations,firmswillbetemptedto
underinvestinorderto pretendto have low current outflows and
high profits.If uncertainty about investment opportunitiesislarge
enough, however, firms may be tempted to overinvest inorderto
pretend that growth opportunities are expanded.
The temptation to underinvest should dominate for established
firms.The following analysis illustrates why.Assume the firm can
only report revenue R and cash outflow X I +C.It provisionally
decidestoinvest the optimal amount 1*,consistent with investors'
expectations.Now it considers changingIand X.Since V1 =0at
1*, the change in the objective function is
WI = =ctP (4)
Managers will reduce I from 1* if <0.
Investors, who in this instance don't know they are about to be
fooled, try to price at intrinsic value.Before X is announced,
P =E(V)=V(R)+5 5[H(I*)-M(C)]f(J*)f(C) dI*dC (5)
C1*
10Here H(I*)isoutsiders' best estimate of NPV once they know that
optimal investment is1* (although ex ante they do not know what 1*
will be).V(R) and M(C) are the capitalized values of revenue R and
current cash outflow C.
For any given C,1* is no longer a random variable;investors
infer 1* =X - C.Therefore6
X f(C) P(X) =V(R)+5[H(X-C)-M(C)]F(X)dC (6)
0




The notation E[ }isshorthand forinvestors'expectation over the
range C =0toX.Note that f(X)fF(X) and f(0)IF(X)arethe
probabilities that C =Xor 0 once X is observed.
Take the right-hand side terms in (7) one by one: an increase
in X is(1) bad news8 becauseitraisesthe upper bound on the
capitalized value of possible costs, relative to the "average" M;(2)
good news9 because it raises the upper limit on investment and NPV,
11relative to the "average" H, and (3) bad news if, on average, an extra
dollar of operating cost reduces value by more than an extra dollar of
investment opportunities increasesit.
Thus there are cases in which the firm is tempted to increase X,
i.e.tooverinvest.Suppose thatthereislittleuncertaintyabout
operatingcosts(M(X)-E(M)small),greatuncertaintyabout
investment opportunities (H(X)-E(H)large), and thatthisperiod's
unanticipated operating costsare mostly viewed astransitory noise
(E[Mc] small). Then could be positive.
But if the ranges of possible C's and I*'s are roughly the same,'0
underinvestment should win out, because the "M-terms" are likelyto
be much larger than the "H-terms".
All this falls out in a very simple way if the current outflow C
is uniformly distributed over the range zero to X.In that case f(O) =
f(X)and f(X)IF(X) =f(O)IF(X)1/X.Suppose further that M(C) =MC,








later periods.Then M(C)C and MC =1,indicating a dollar-for-
dollar reduction in V when C increases.Then is negative unless
H(X)/X + E(H1) exceeds 2.
These H-terms' units are basically NPV per dollar invested.If
IRR(X)-r investment generates level, perpetual cash flow, H(X)/X is r
where IRR(X) isthe average IRR when 1* =X,and ris the cost of
capital.For the other H-term,
+I*dIRRrfdI*1
IRR-r
A positive 'xrequiresron the order of 1.0.For example, if IRR
=2rat all I*'s, then 'r
r
=1.0exactly, and P< =0.But finding a
projectthatoffers double thecost of capitalinperpetuityisrare
luck.
If changes in current outflows are expected tobe permanent,
then Mc = farin excess of reasonable NPV for an unanticipated
dollar of investment.
The only ways to push P positive in these examples areto
assume(1)unrealisticallyhighprofitabilityforunanticipated
investment,or(2)thatexpanded investmenttodayalsosignals
13expanded futureopportunities,sothat prospective NPVs are rolled
into G(I) and H(I*).However, unrealistically high profitability may
have to be assumed even in case 2.In order for present and future
investments to be worthper dollar of current investment, the firm
would have to earn twice the cost of capitalinperpetuity onthis
year's project, and also gain the opportunity to invest ina perpetual
stream of equally attractive projects.Only in such cases would P ￿
0be plausible.
None ofthesecomparisons provethattheunderinvestment
incentivewilldominate.Highly profitable growth firms may be
tempted to overinvest, in order to pretend to have better than their
actualinvestmentopportunities. However,thetemptationto
underinvest should dominate for mature firms.The nextsection
takesa closer lookat how thisincentive plays out ina signaling
equilibrium.




investors. The model yieldsafully-revealingsignaling equilibrium
formally similar to Miller and Rock's (1985), though with a different
economic interpretation.Inthe end investorsarenot fooled by
14changesinreportedcashoutflow,butmanagerscannotescape
underinvesting.
Assume thereissome maximum possible current outflow C.
The investment function G(I) has a maximum G(I*) at1* >0.Also
G(0) =0.We take MC =M,a positive constant.Only cash flow is
reported toinvestors.
Inthefully-revealingequilibrium,outsideinvestorsinferthe
true value of C and I by observing X.From their point of view, C is a
function C(X), 1(X) =X-C(X),and P(X) equals the true value V:
P(X) =V(C(X),X)=V(C,X) (8)
The top bracket shows investors' inference of V given X; the bottom
bracket states that their inference iscorrect.
The firm maximizes W =aP+(1-cz)V,with V= V(R) +G(X-C)-
M(C).It considers W:
W =a(Gj(1-Cx)-MCX)+(1-a)G1 (9)
Note that the firm recognizes that a change in X will change P(X) by
changing investors' beliefs about costs, C(X).
15Set W =0and solve:
Cy (10)
Figure 1shows the equilibrium behavior of C(X) implied bythis
differential equation.Note that the firm does ijunderinvestwhen
current cash outflow isat the upper bound C.The firm makes the
best of the worst possible case by investing 1*.Atthatboundary
(C=C), G1 =0and C =0.
But when C <C,the firm underinvests to report lower X and to
tryto pretend thatitisbetter thanit reallyis.The resultis shown
in Figure 2.Note that dI/dX becomes very large as X approaches X.
The cost of underinvestment is low in this region because G1 is close
to zero.Thus a firm with C =.98Chas to underinvest "alot'to
distinguishitself credibly from the still-worse firm with C =.99C.
But when Cissubstantiallylessthan C,G1andthecostof
underinvestmentarehigh,solessunderinvestmentoccursatthe
margin where C increases.
Figures 1and 2 have been drawn sothatlower X always
signals lower costs and lower or equal investment.That requires C
cLMC
￿1 and G1 ￿ .Clearlythis is so for I close to 1*, because G1 =0 1-a
16at optimal investment.Reducing C and X drivesI down and G1 up.
aM
AsG1 approaches the lower bound
1-a flattens out.1 2
Thedegree of underinvestment depends directly on a and on
M. The incentive to signal isstrongest when a heavy weight a is put
on share price,ratherthan on intrinsicvalue, and when revealed
current cash outflow has a large negative impact on marketvalue.
Note from (10) that higher a or M always reduce Cx for X <X.Since
0X) always equals C =X-1*,a lower Cx requires a higher C(X) curve.
Increasing a or M also increases the upper bound on G1 and reduces




which implies G1 =10-I,1* =10and G(1*) =50.The current
outflow C isuniformly distributed over the range 0 to C =10,and
M(C) =MC(Mc =M,a constant).The present value of revenues is
V(R) =200.




Unfortunately,itwill signal, and underinvest except when C is
at the maximum C =10.Given C, the firm invests less when a and
M are large.Figure 3 plots investment as a function of C for a =.3
andM =10.This behavior yields ex ante firm value of 194.7, a
shortfall of 5.3 from the value of 200 assuming optimal investment.
This shortfall is10.5 percent of G(1*), the NPV of optimal investment.
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186.Gains From NondiscretionaryAccounting
The only possible role for accountantsinthe signaling model
just presented would betoverifythat cash revenues and outflows
were honestly reported.They would not be requiredto interpret
cash flows.
Real accountants do interpret, by putting some cash outflows
onthebalancesheet,leavingthe residualasa"cost"of current
operations. Iregard thisasa crude separation of good-news from
bad-newsoutflows.
An accountant (or accounting rule)that could distinguishthe
true current outflow C embedded in X would eliminate signaling-by-
underinvestment.(Once investors know C, Cx =0,and setting W =
G1=0implies optimal investment.)
But an accountant cannot truly distinguish C from I because he
or she must be an an outsider and thus can never be sure of insiders
motives for spending money.Indeed an accountant who attempted a
subjective assessment of C andIwould be naturally suspectedof
shadingtowardsmanagers'andsellingstockholders'interests.
Instead,accountants(or accounting rules)classify expendituresnot
by their motivation, but by use, e.g. for wages, equipment, R&D, etc.
This will convey valuable information, however,if expenditures that
go on the balance sheet are more likelyto be motivated by good
news than expenditures that are left as current costs.
19A
Theimperfect accountant reportsa"cost" estimate C =C+e,
where eisnoise with expectation zero and range± è.Assume that
A
èissmall enough that the upper end ofthis range, C +e,is less than
C foratleast some estimates C.The manager knows C when the
A
investmentdecisionis made, and C isindependent of that decision.
Inother words, managers bondthemselves ahead of timetoaccept
A
theaccountant's report C.
This reportis"objective" and not discretionary.The manager,
who knows the true currentoutflow, and might instinctivelyliketo
A
reportC as low as possible, cannot twist theaccountant's arm or bend
the accounting rules.As we willsee,this commitmentisinall
shareholders' ex anteinterests.
A
Considera class of firms with agiven reported C and actual
A A
currentoutflows ranging from C -eto C +e.If they invest optimally,
their true C's are revealed as C =X -1*.But since they face the same
a's, G1's and M's with or without the accountant onhand, they will
A
againbe drawn into signaling.The accounting reportC definesa
A A
cohortwith true current outflowsranging fromC -eto C +e.The
A
worstfirm in the cohort faces current outflows C +e.This worst firm
has nothing tolose, invests1*, and reports X =C+I.The rest
underinvest.
20A A
Figures4showsthe result.GivenC,the functionC( X IC)=
A
X-J*when C is at its highest possible value C +e.As C declines,
A
C(X
IC)slopes down to the left in the same general way as before.' 3
A A
Clearlythere is one C(X
IC)function for each possible C,'4 all
withintheenvelopeofC(X)derivedforaworldwithout
accountants.15
In other words, accountants reduce underinvestment.Figure 4
A
showsnvestment as a function of C given one possible value for C.
A
Againthere is a family of such curves, one for each C.All but one lie
abovetheinvestmentsthat would be made inaworld without
accountants.The one exceptionisthe far-right curve, which begins
with 1* atC;this one lies theenvelope.16
The value of non-discretionary accountingisobvious.Firms
underinvest less.All firms are worth more ex ante.Almost all firms
are worth more ex post, and none are worth less.Table1shows how
ex ante value lost from underinvestment depends on a, M and the
accountant's maximum error .Naturallythe loss decreases asthe
accountant's accuracy increases.
Thistableclearlyillustrateswhymanagersactingin
shareholders' ex ante interests should bond themselves to accept the
constraints of external,"objective" accounting rules.
21Aconjectureaboutconservatism.--Whatkind of
A
accountingsignal does the manager hope for?For a signal C which is
as low as possible;the firm isbetter off being a high-cost firm in a
cohortwith low reportedcosts.Thusinaone-period model,
managerswillalwaysbetemptedtocajoletheaccountantto
understate costs and overstate reported income.
But if we pose the question differently the manager could vote
for"conservatism"inaccounting.Accountants define conservatism
asa predisposition to record futurelosses and expenses, even when
uncertain, but to defer recognitionof revenues or other gains until
proved.The ideaisto provide the "most conservative measure of
net income" and to "avoid unwarrantedoptimism."17
This could be rationalizedasfollows.Take theaccounting
A
signalC asgiven.What kinds of errorsare most serious--cost
overestimatesorunderestimates?
A
GivenC,it'sthe underestimates thatreallyhurt.The upper
A
boundon true costs is critical.Look again at Figure 4.Given C, a
reductioninthe maximum possible underestimateshiftsthestarting
A
pointof the upper curve, where I(CC) =1*,to the left, and leads to
A
higherinvestment for allfirms with the same C.Ex ante, the firm
therefore prefers a "conservative" accountant;allfirms in the cohort
A
withthe same C are better off if the maximum cost underestimate is
as small as possible.
22This kind of conservatism does not mean a low standard error.
It means chopping off the righttailof the distribution of possible
costs as close as possible to its mean --notthe same thing as fudging
A
inan upward bias to C.(Mere downward bias in cost estimatesis
pointless because investors will just take the fudge out again.Think
A
ofC as investors' expectation of costs given the accounting signal.)In
thispaper'sanalysis conservatismwould mean changing the shape
ofthedistribution.Accountantsshouldshifttheirtimeand
resources to the task of eliminating high-cost outliers.
7.Conclusions
The main points of the two models presented inthis paper can
be summarized as follows.The heart of the problem is asymmetric
information,specificallyinvestors'inabilitytodistinguishcash
outlaysforcurrentoperationsfromoutlaysforinvestment.
Managers are concerned with current stock price as well asintrinsic
value,andthusaretemptedtoreduceinvestmentinorderto
pretend to have lower operating costs.They end up ina signaling
equilibriuminwhichinvestorslearnthetrueoperatingcostsof
every firm.All but one firm must underinvesttomaintaintheir
place in the signaling equilibrium.The firm with the highest possible
costs invests optimally, because there are notstillhigher-cost firms
that could imitate it.
Signalingbyunderinvestmentisacostlychannelfor
information. Accountingreportsareusuallycheaper. If
23nondiscretionary accounting rules could identifytruecostsexactly,
there wouldbeno temptationtosignaland no underinvestment.
Noisyaccountingcostestimatesnarrowtherangeofpossible
operating costs and reduce the scope forsignaling.Investmentis
increased and thecosts of signaling reduced.
The accounting cost estimates are not necessary to reveal true
coststoinvestors.Signaling doesthatwithout any accounting
reports.The noisy accounting estimates areapartialsubstitute for
signaling; they convey information that would otherwise have to be
signaled by underinvestment.Managers actinginshareholders'ex
anteinterestswillbond themselvestoreport by"objective"rules
implemented, or atleast monitored by outside accountants.
This paper's analysisisformally similar to Miller and Rock's
signaling treatment of dividend payouts.Their model also hasthe
firm cutting back on cash outlays in order to initiate lower-cost and
higher-incomefirms.However,theyleave"income"undefined
exceptbyreferencetoeconomictheory. Ihavespecifically
identifiedthe components of income whichIbelieveto beatthe
heart of the problem, thatisunanticipated cash outlays for current
operationsand investments.18Accounting informationis valuable to
investorsprimarilybecauseithelpsdistinguishthesetwo
components, not because accountants attempt estimate trueeconomic
income.19
24IfIam right,some attemptstoimprovetheaccuracyor
relevance of accounting income are just wasted motion.For example,
investorsevident lack of interestinprice-level adjusted accounts20
iseasilyexplainedifinvestorsarenotlookingtoaccounting
informationtoestimaterealeconomicincome,butmainlyto
distinguish unanticipated current and investment outflows.Most of
the information accountants provide onthisdistinction was already
inhistoricalcost books.For example,inflationadjusted income
statements would restatedepreciationincurrentdollars.Ideally,
current replacement cost depreciation would be used.Obviously this
would beahelpfulstep towards reportingreal economic income.
However,usingabetterdepreciationnumberforpastcapital
investment gives no assistancetoinvestorstryingtoseparatethe
good and bad news in unanticipated current cash outlays.
25*MITSloan School of Management andNBER.This paper's main
ideas were developedduringavisiting appointment atthe London
Business School. Ithank Julian Franks, Paul Healy and Anthony




1)Inside accountants, e.g. the controller, aretreated as management.
2)Severalrecentpaperspresentmodels which couldexplain
accounting asa rational response to agencyproblems,in which a
compensation ruleor contract must beworked out inasituation
wherethemanager'seffortorperformance cannotbeobserved
directly.Examplesarethepapersby Lambert (1984)and by
Demski, Patell and Wolfson (1984).
3)Titman and Trueman (1986) is a partial exception.They assume
that firms want to signal low earningsvolatility.Some firms can do
this by damping fluctuationsin reported income, but others cannot.
Investors cannot distinguish the two groups.The resultis a pooling
equilibriuminwhichsomehigh-volatilityfirmsuseincome
smoothing to imitate lower-volatility firms.
4)Miller and Rock (1985) discuss the pros and consof this objective
function.One obvious con is that putting no weight on currentstock
price (a =0)leaves all shareholders better off ex ante.However, it's
difficultto insulate managers from pressurefrom shareholders who
have decided to sell right away.
Of course managers could pay attention to currentstock price for
other seasons, e.g. because of takeover threats.
265)See the discussion of "information costs" in Myers and Majiuf
(1984),195-196.
6)If there is some known minimum value of C, we can net it against
R and still integrate from zero to X in (6).
7)A derivation is available from the author.
8)Bad news unless the probability f(0) is much larger than f(X).
9)Good news unless f(X) is much larger than f(0).
10)In other words, I assume here for convenience that the cx post X
is less than the highest possible ex ante 1*.
11) Thanksto Anthony Neuberger forhelpful comments onthis
model.
12)Could minimum investment be negative?Yes.Ifis less than
when X -C=I=0,firms with still lower costs will be forced to 1-a
sell off assets (at a net loss) to signal effectively.Of course in such
cases the zero point for investment could be redefined in terms f
maximum disinvestment.For example I =$1could reflect a decision
to keep $1 of existing assets that could have been sold.
13)C( X I) isnot an exact transposition of C(X) unless MC i S
constant.
14)These functions "bunch up" when X is close to X.Thinkof
and 2with upper bounds +> +> C.Ineach case the
27worst possible firm has costsC.Therefore the curves forC( X
and C( X C2)are identical.
15)We can show that the curvesC( X I)never cross theC(X)
curve. For any costC <C, Cx(X I< Cbecause the accounting
signal leads to higher X and I and therefore lowerG1.Cx(X I) and
are equal in the limitof very low C.If the slopes are equal at
this only possible crossing point, the curves cannot cross.
16)Note, however, that not all of this curve is likely to bepopulated.
The best possible firm on this curve has costsC-2.Unless is
verylarge,therewillbestillbetterfirmswith lower C, which
without accountants would have been ontheenvelopeatlower
investment.
17)See Davidson, et al. (1988), pp. 628-629, 725.
18)Remember thatin my model cost and investment donot
correspond to the accounting definitions of these terms.For example,
Iwould define investment as cash outlays caused by unanticipated
expansionoftheinvestmentopportunityset;anticipatedcapital
outlays would be treated as a current "cost."
19)Book income does seem to convey information to investors that
is not found just in reported cash flow.See, for example, Bowen, et
al. (1987).
20)See, for example, Beaver (1983).
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Figure I. Operating costs (C) as a function of total
cash outflows (X) in a signaling equilibrim.
C(X) is the heavy line.
x
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Total cash outflow, X
Figure2.Investment as a function of total cash
outflows X. The firm invests the optimal














































































































Figure 4. Investment as a function ofoperating
cost c. The curvei(Cle) assumes
occountants report a noisy cost estimate
C. The film with the highestcosts




Value Losses from Underinvestment with
Noisy Accounting Signals
(Percentage of NPV at Optimal Investment)
Accountant's a —.2 a —.3 a —.3 a —
MaximumError, M —5 M —5 M —10 M —10
Percent of True
Current Outflow
1 .15 .2 .5 .9
5 .5 1.0 2.2 4.2
10 .8 1.6 3.8 7.8
20 1.1 2.4 6.3 14.1
30 1.2 2.8 8.1 19.5
50 1.3 3.3 10.5 26.6
Value
loss with
no accounting 1.3 3.3 10.5 26.6
signal